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Abstract
Trading blocks can help or hinder the liberalization of world trade. A determining factor is
whether trade within the block is organized around traditional comparative advantages, or
around economies of scale .
Regional free trade agreements such as NAFTA can be a substitutes for global free trade
when they are based on traditional comparative advantages ; then each regional market develops
market power and incentives to impose tariffs on the rest of the world. Alternatively, regional
trade agreements can be complementary to global free trade . This occurs when the blocks are
organized around the exploitation of economies of scale and based on knowledge-intensive
sectors.
I establish that external economies of scale produce incentives for expanded trade; they can
defeat the standard arguments for "optimal tariffs" and mitigate another negative feature of
trading blocks : their tendency to divert trade from efficient to inefficient sources. The emergence
of regional blocks organized around economies of scale can therefore lead to increasingly open
international markets. I discuss policy implications for the EU and for free trade in the Americas .
1 The EU, NAFTA and the Gatt
Regional free trade zones have been unexpectedly successful in the last decade .
Since 1980 the European Union enlarged significantly its membership and its
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scope. Today the EU includes southern European countries, and it allows goods,
people, services and capital to flow freely around an area accounting for about one
fourth of world economic output.
In what appears to be a strategic response, the US has been activated to enter
into similar agreements with its neighbors . The arithmetic is simple. The US
accounted for about 40 117c of the world's output after the Second World War,2 a
figure that decreased steadily until today, when it represents about 25 1,7c . The recent
completion of the European Union faced the US for the first time since 1945 with a
unified group of countries that matches its own economic prowess . This changed
matters : shortly afterwards a trade and investment agreement was signed with
Canada followed almost immediately by the adoption of NAFTA. The agreement
could expand to the rest of the Americas .
The same trend is observed in other regions . The six members of the
Association of South East Asian Nations - Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei - have began in 1992 to build their Asean
free trade area AFTA as a future counterweight to other international trading
blocks. The Japanese have increasingly focused their economic attention in their
own region, leading to more investment in and imports from the new East Asian
manufacturing exporters. Even the Andean Pact seems to be progressing in Latin
America after several decades of aimless discussions, with Mercosur following suit.
Of the fourteen trading blocks in existence today' seven have been formed since
1992 .
While regional free trade agreements prosper, the negotiations towards the
liberalization of global trade have floundered for many years. The last round of
Gatt negotiations, the Uruguay Round, was ratified recently by the US and also by
the EU. All along the agricultural markets have been a key negotiating problem:
this will be discussed later as an excellent example of the issues involved .
While the Gatt negotiations are political, it is reasonable to seek explanations
for the situation from an economic viewpoint. The contrast between the lackluster
performance of the Gatt and the success of the regional trade pacts raise disparate
reactions . One view is that the emergence of regional trade pacts is a step in the
right direction. "Custom unions", as regional free trade pacts are usually called, are
in this view stepping stones towards world free trade . Another, quite distinct,
reaction, is to fear that "customs unions" are inherently opposed to global free
trade. Do custom unions increase free trade with insiders at the cost of diverting
trade with outsiders?
2 Before the Second World War the US represented about 25% of the world economy. This
increased to 40% after the War due to the destruction of the German and Japanese economies .
' EU inaugurated in 1958, SEMAC in 1964, ASEAN in 1967, ANDEAN in 1969, CACM in 1974,
ECOWAS in 1975, PTA in 1981, SADC in 1992, UEMOA in 1994, NAFTA in 1994,
MERCOSUR in 1994/95, G3 in 1994/95, APEC in 1994 and VISEGRAD in 1994 .
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Since the classic works of Meade [21] and Viner [26], who classified the issues
into trade creation and trade diversion, there has been little conceptual advance on
this issue. But the issue is very alive today, and requires our attention .
This paper will re-examine the positive and negative aspects of trading
blocks as they relate to gains from free trade. It is primarily a discussion of
conceptual issues, although it is based on facts and on particular cases which are
of interest to the trade liberalization in the Americas. I take a somewhat
different approach to a familiar issue . Rather than asking the standard question
of whether regional blocks help or hinder global free trade, I ask : what type of
trading block is likely to lead to a trade war between the blocks, and what type
is, instead, likely to expand global trade? In practical terms: what type of trade
regimes within the blocks will provide economic incentives for expanding free
trade?
I shall compare the impact on the world economy of trading blocks which are
organized around two alternative principles, or trade regimes. One is traditional
comparative advantages, the other is external economies ofscale. These represent
two patterns of growth : resource-intensive vs . knowledge-intensive . The aim is to
determine how the patterns of trade inside the blocks determine the trade relations
among the blocks .
The paper has four parts . The first part reviews the existing economics of
trading blocks, and uses this to explain the current situation in the EU and
NAFTA. The second part presents a new conceptual approach focusing on the
internal organization of the trading blocks and the economic incentives that this
generates with respect to the rest of the world. The third part is a conclusion which
pulls the arguments together for an evaluation of NAFTA, EU, and global free
trade. The fourth part is an Appendix which provides a formal general equilibrium
model of trading blocks, an extension of my model of North-South trade [4-6]
which incorporates goods which are produced with external economies of scale . I
establish rigorously in the Appendix the results which underlie the discussion in the
text .
2 The Economics of Trading Blocks
International trade in the last ten years focussed on economic dynamics and on
market imperfections . However the central tenet of the theory of international
trade remains the same : the classic results on the efficiency of competitive
markets .
In competitive markets, free trade leads to Pareto efficient allocations . There
is no way to make a someone better off without making someone else worse off.
4 I benefitted from the ideas of Jane Jacobs in "Cities and the Wealth of Nations", Random
House, 1985 .
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Called the first theorem of welfare economics, the general result that competitive
markets lead to efficient allocations seems to loom the larger, the more special
cases of market imperfections are pointed out .
In view of the efficiency of competitive markets, the difficulties faced by Gatt
in bringing an agreement about a world of free trade seems, at a first sight,
irrational . It would appear that countries act as if they could, but prefer not to,
achieve an efficient allocation . Indeed, some believe that the failure of Gatt is
simply a version of the well-known prisoners' dilemma. 5
Are countries irrational in evading free trade? Such a view would be incorrect.
The Gatt's problems derive not from irrational behavior, not from a lack of
coordination . There is a simple, rational explanation: while free trade in
competitive markets leads to efficient solutions, when countries are large and have
market power, this is no longer true . Free trade may not lead to Pareto efficient
allocations when the countries are large and have market power. Indeed, large
countries may choose the quantities they export in order to manipulate to their
advantage world market prices, much the same way that a monopolist chooses to
supply a quantity that maximizes its profits considering its impact on prices . Such
strategies are rational for large countries. The only case where free trade leads
surely to Pareto efficient allocations is when markets are competitive, when no
country has market power.
Do all countries stand to gain from a move to free trade? The answer is
negative . Under classical assumptions, a move from tariffs to free trade will
typically make some countries better off but other countries worse off. It is true
that if a competitive allocation were reached, it would be Pareto efficient . But in a
world with tariffs, as we have today, under traditional assumptions some country
will loose if free trade is adopted. There is therefore no reason for all countries to
agree to free trade .
Indeed when countries are sufficiently large to have an impact on market
prices, then they have an incentive to impose tariffs on each other. One may
ask: precisely how do large countries benefit from protectionism? How do tariffs
work?
Large countries can improve their position by improving their terms of trade:
the prices of exports relative to those of imports. Better terms of trade means that
the country pays less for what it buys, and receives more forwhat sells. A country is
typically better off with better terms of trade.
Of course, in competitive markets countries do not manipulate terms of trade
to their advantage : this is practically the definition of competitive markets. But
international trade theory proves that, under traditional assumptions, a large
country does have an economic incentive to impose tariffs on others. This is the
5 The words "prisoners' dilemma" are used to describe a generically inefficient situation, one
which, with appropriate coordination between the players, can be altered so as to improve the
welfare of all .
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standard theorem on optimal tariffs, which is discussed in more detail below. The
theorem says that, under traditional assumptions, there is always an optimal tariff,
one at which the gains from increasing its terms of trade through tariffs exceeds the
losses due to the attendant distortions. This theorem is widely accepted,
understood and applied.
The argument in favor of optimal tariffs is of course not true for small
countries. For this argument it is essential that the country should be large enough
to have an impact on prices . Furthermore the larger the country, the more market
power it has, and the more it can gain from imposing tariffs on others .
The importance of all this today is that if a world of small competitive
economies merges into a few large trading blocks traditional, under traditonal
assumptions, after the blocks are formed, there are more incentives for imposing
tariffs than before . In other words, under traditional conditions, regional trade
blocks, lead to protectionism.
The optimal tariff which we have just discussed is imposed by one country on
others unilaterally . The classic theorem does not consider the possibility of
retaliation by other countries. But what if they retaliate? What if other countries
also impose tariffs in response?
We now move to a world of strategic considerations, a world with tariff wars.
Each country imposes tariffs on each other, and does so strategically so as to
maximize its welfare given the actions of others . The outcome of this tariff game
was studied in Kennan and Riezman [15, 16]. If each country chooses as its tariff
the best response to the others', a market equilibrium with tariffs is reached. We
call this an optimal tariff equilibrium to distinguish it from the free trade
equilibrium .b
In an optimal tariff equilibrium some countries are better of than they would
be at a free trade equilibrium, [15, 16] and [25] . Furthermore, these works show
that the larger the country, the more it can improve its welfare at the optimal tariff
equilibrium .
To a certain extent the current situation in the world economy can be
described as an optimal tariff equilibrium . Each country imposes tariffs on others
strategically. In this light the difficulties of the Gatt have a reasonable explanation.
The unwillingness of countries to agree to multilateral free trade is neither
irrational nor a coordination problem . It is a rational response to economic
incentives of countries with market power.
One immediate implication is that regional trade blocks will increase the
market power of the market participants and therefore can lead to tariff wars .
Under traditional conditions, the larger is the market power of a trade block, the
larger is its incentive to impose tariffs on others . Even after retaliatory moves are
6 It is not a competitive trade situation because the traders act strategically, manipulating prices .
In a world with free and competitive trade, no-one has an impact on prices, nor does anyone act
according to price strategies .
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taken into account the same proposition holds: the larger the market power of the
block, the greater its gains from a tariff war .
Since these results predict that regional free trade zones create incentives
against global free trade under traditional assumptions, it is crucial to examine
these assumptions closely . For whenever these conditions are satisfied, regional
free trade inevitably leads to trade wars . And the larger the free trade zones, the
more likely is that they will lead to trade wars.
I examine these conditions in the next section . This examination will be
conceptual, but focused on particular cases of immediate interest . Recalling
classical results on tariffs of A. Lerner [18] and of L . Metzler[23],' and based on
new results on trading blocks with economies of scale of Chichilnisky [8] reported
in the Appendix, I show that if the blocks are organized internally around the
principle of economies of scale, the optimal tariff theorem can be defeated . With
increasing returns, a country may be better offwithfree trade than with tariffs . Before
I turn to the new results, I will explore the implications of the classic optimal tariff
theorem on the European Union and on NAFTA.
NAFTA - and anyfurther extension to a larger free trade zone in the Americas
- emerged as a strategic response by the US to the creation of the European Union.
The European Union is a free trade zone with a quarter of world output . In seeking
to form a trading block with its natural trading partners in the Americas, the US
appears to respond to the creation of market power, with an attempt to create more
market power itself. This is a rational response if the US expects a united Europe to
impose tariffs on the rest of the world . As discussed above, the emergence of a
region with increased market power generally provides an incentive to other
regions to seek similar status .
More explanatory power still can be extracted from the results of Kennan and
Riezman [15, 16] and Riezman [25] on who wins trade wars. Following the creation
of a custom union, the incentives are not just to create or join another free trade
zone. The economic incentive is to join another free trade zone with the largest
possible market power. This result allows us to predict that the US will seek a free
trade deal with as many countries in the Americas as possible . The aim is to reach
market power which exceeds that of a unified Europe.
The final result on world trade will however depend on the trade patterns
adopted within the blocks . Trade patterns within the EU and NAFTA can be based
either on traditional comparative advantages or on economies of scale . These are
two different patterns of development, which can be broadly illustrated by Asian-
type development strategies, which focus on knowlege-intensive products such as
consumer electronics, communications and financial markets, and African and
Latinamerican-style type development strategies, which focus instead on resources
' Lerner and Metzler do not refer to economies of scale : their results on the impact of tariffs on
terms of trade are due to income effects .
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and labor intensive products . The former emphasize products which rely on an
educated labor force and human capital . The latter emphasizes resources and
cheap, mostly uneducated, labor intensive products . It is to a certain extent a
matter of policy choice which pattern of development is adopted. The choice is
either products and technologies which are associated to external economies of
scale, or those associated to traditional comparative advantages . In sum : trade
policies within a trade block determine the extent to which the trade block will aid
or hinder global free trade . The argument for this result, and its implications for
trade policy, will occupy the rest of this paper.
3 Trade Creation and Diversion
3 .1 The Traditional Case
How do we measure the gains and the losses of creating a free trade zone?
A naive view on this is that since free trade in competitive markets is Pareto
efficient, any move towards free trade is positive . As we saw, this argument is
not correct. Regional trade blocks, being larger than their components, will have
more market power and therefore under traditional conditions will impose
tariffs against outsiders. Therefore trading blocks hurt the countries outside
these areas.
Are free trade zones only damaging to outsiders? The answer to this question
is : generally no. There is a second source of potential damage. The trading block
can lead to trade diversion . This means that a trade block may lead to the wrong
specialization within the block . The classical argument about trade diversion is
found in Viner [26], whose work remains a benchmark of analysis for preferential
trade agreements . I summarize his argument here in order to show that, if trading
within the blocks is organized around economies of scale, then Viner's argument
can break down. With economies of scale, the negative effect of trade diversion can
be mitigated. The empirical evidence discussed below suggests that this is what has
happened in the European Common Market since 1958 .
Viner's argument can be captured from the textbook table presented below :
There are three countries, Germany, Portugal and the USA . They trade a
commodity, vegetable oil. Initially Germany has a tariff that applies equally to all
imported oil, no matter what its source . If it imports oil despite the tariff, it will buy
initially from the USA, which offers the best price. The example appears in the
second column, showing a low initial tariff. However if the tariff is high enough,
then Germany will produce its own oil, as in column 3 . What happens if now
Germany enters into a free trade agreement with Portugal?
If the tariff was initially the level indicated in column 2 of Figure 1, the
welfare of Germany increases after the regional block is created, since it replaces
its domestic oil with a less expensive oil and uses its domestic resources in
Fig . 1 . The effects of Trading Blocks: Trade Diversion .
G . Chichilniskv
more productive sectors. However, if the tariff was initially higher, as in
column 3 of Figure l, then after the free trade agreement Germany shifts from
American to Portuguese oil, i.e . from a low cost to a higher cost producer. In
this case, the free trade zone lowers welfare in the participating region . It has
diverted trade.
Viner's point is that there are "trade creating" free trade zones, which increase
imports by members from one another . These imports replace less efficient
domestic production, and are therefore desirable . On the other hand, free trade
blocks can "divert trade" : imports can be diverted from a lower cost source outside
the block to a less efficient source inside the block. The insider source could be less
productive but may offer more attractive prices after the tariffs were selectively
dropped. The latter trading is undesirable .
Extra trade among the members of the trading block can improve welfare. The
trade which is a diversion from efficient outsiders to less efficient insiders, lowers
welfare . For example if northern Europe is induced by the entry of southern
Europe to buy oil from Portugal rather than an equivalent from the US, and the US
source is more efficient but less competitive after the tariffs are dropped, there has
been a welfare loss . Generally speaking Viner's approach evaluates free trade zones
by the extent to which more trade is created, rather than existing trade diverted
from one source to another.
3 .2 Economies of Scale Mitigate Trade Diversion
Viner's original insight remains central to the analysis of preferential free trade
zones . But, in practice, it misses an important aspect . The increased size of the
market can sometimes lead to more efficiency and competitiveness . Even in the
cases where Viner's analysis predicts welfare losses, namely when the trade block
diverts trade to inside sources which are initially less competitive, welfare can still
increase with economies of scale. This can be explained simply in our numerical
example .
154
Cost of Veg . Oil Tariffs
0 8 12
Germany 20 20 20
Portugal before EEC 16 24 28
Portugal after EEC 16 16 16
USA 10 18 22
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Fig. 2. Trade is not Diverted with Economies of Scale.
As Portugal expands its oil production due to its new trade with Germany, it
can become more efficient due to economies of scale . This situation is illustrated in
Figure 2, column 1 . After the tariffs are removed Portugal produces and exports
more oil and in the process it becomes more competitive and its costs drop,
reaching or improving upon the US level. In sum : with economies of scale, Viner's
analysis is reversed .
Economies of scale can have a major impact on trade policies . They can
check the negative effects of trade diversion. I shall argue in what follows that
they can also limit another negative effect : the incentives for large blocks with
market power to impose tariffs on outsiders. These are the two major drawbacks
of trading blocks: tariff wars and trade diversion. Both drawbacks are reduced
and could be eliminated in trade regimes based on economies of scale .
3 .3 Empirical Evidence for Economies of Scale:
Knowledge-intensive Growth
What does the empirical evidence show?8 It is widely believed that economies of
scale were an important factor in the Treaty of Rome. Economies of scale were
central to the success of the European Common Market which was formed in 1958 .
While a strong possibility for trade diversion existed a priori in the EU, in reality
g Although the central body of international trade theory is based on the assumption of constant
returns to scale, the belief is widespread that increasing returns are important in reality, and
there is a large body of literature specifically addressing the issues that emerge . Classical
references are Graham [ 12] and Viner [27] ; modern references include Mathews [ 19] Meade [20]
and more recently Chichilnisky and Heal [9] Chapter 3, Ethier [11], and Krugman and Obstfeld
[17] . Howeverthe literature has neglected the issue of trading blocks with economies of scale as
studied here . In fact, while the results of Graham and Viner argue that increasing returns to
scale are a motive for protection, my results argue that, to the contrary, increasing returns
provide a reason against tariffs, and for free trade.
Cost of Veg. Oil Tariffs
0 8 12
Germany 20 20 20
Portugal before EEC 16 24 28
Portugal after EEC 9 9 9
USA 10 18 22
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huge inter-industry trade emerged in manufactures . The increase in market size
and the associated rationalization in production led to efficiency gains which took
precedence over possible trade diversion.
A discussion of the empirical evidence for economies of scale in the US and in
Europe is in Chichilnisky and Heal [9], and the reader is referred to that source . Of
particular interest are all sectors which require large scale production for efficiency
such as automobile industry and aerospace . These were traditonally the most
important sectors in the US economy. More recently, economies of scale became
prominent in sectors where knowledge is an important input, such as computer
processing, hardware and software, telecommunications, financial markets and
genetic engineering . Chichilnisky and Heal [9] developed a rigorous foundations of
international trade with increasing returns in a neoclassical model of trade with
two countries and two goods, and discussed the policy implications of economies
of scale for North-South trade .9
An interesting discussion on the matter of returns to scale is also in a recent
paper which does not draw the connection between economies of scale, optimal
tariffs and trade diversion, but provides evidence for the US-Canada case and for
the EU'°: "Indeed, hopes for large benefits from both the US-Canada free trade
agreement and Europe 1992 rest largely on an increase in competition and
rationalization. In the North American case, the estimate of Harris and Cox, which
attempt to take account of competitive/industrial organization effects, suggest a
gain for Canada from free trade that is about 4 time larger than those of standard
models . In Europe the widely cited and somewhat controversial figure of 7 percent
gain due to 1992 presented in the Cechini report of the Commission of the
European Communities 1988 rests primarily on estimates by Alisdair Smith and
Anthony Venables of gains from increased competition and rationalization."
A standard textbook analysis of economies of scale is in Nicholson [24],
"Costs", pages 252-255, who documents that most studies of long-run cost curves
have found that average costs are decreasing up to a point and then constant .
Examples provided are agriculture, electricity generation, railroads, and commer-
cial banking, all activites which are broadly associated with economic develop-
ment. The same textbook analysis explains how competitive markets can lead to a
negative association of quantities and prices across equilibria which is typical of
economies of scale. This was the content of the famous debate in the 1920's
between J. H. Clapham, A. C. Pigou and D. H. Robertson, which was resolved
positively, and which appeared in the Economic Journal between 1922 and 1924,
9 They show that when the North exports goods with economies of scale and the South exports
goodswithout, the North benefits from trade expansion, but the South's term of trade typically
drop, Chapter 3 .
to See P. Krugman "The Move to Free Trade Zones" Working Paper, Economics Department,
MIT, 1991, presented at the UN-ECLA June 1992 Conference on Trade Liberalization in the
Americas, Washington D.C .
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see Nicholson [24], "Perfectly Competitive Pricing in the Long Run" page 332.
These authors agree that competitive markets can show a negative association
between prices and quantities in the long run. A typical example of this
phenomenon is the computer industry . Chichilnisky and Heal [9] have discussed in
some detail the policy implications of international trade in economies with
increasing returns to scale in a report on trade policies in the 1980's to the Secretary
General of UNCTAD . They arrive at similar conclusions.
I have argued that economies of scale can defeat trade diversion, and
transform the attendant potential losses into gains . I will also argue below that
increasing returns can defeat the incentives for tariff wars between blocks . Trade
diversion and tariffs are the main forces which oppose the simultaneous
development of trading blocks and free world trade . Therefore the formation of
trading blocks with increasing returns can become a parallel, complementary
effort towards the liberalization of world trade .
4 Trading Blocks With Economies of Scale
4.1 Trade Inside and Between the Blocks
Although predictions are inherently dangerous in an area so circumscribed by
political action, my conclusion is that trade blocks can have different effects on
global markets depending on their structure . It is the choice of well informed and
reasonable economic agents which structure will prevail .
Regional trading blocks based on traditional comparative advantages will
generally divert trade. They will also typically hinder the propects of global
negotiations. In this case, as the block has more market power then its parts, it has
the incentive to impose tariffs on the rest of the world . Regional blocks develop
incentives for trade wars. This type of regional free trade zone works against global
free trade .
However, if trade blocks are oriented to the expansion of trade based on
increased size and on the productive efficiency and competitiveness that comes
with economies of scale, matters are different. In this latter case, the regional free
trade zones could unleash an appetite for further expansion of trade. In this case
the incentive for blocks to impose tariffs is reduced, and can be defeated by the
incentive in favor of trade expansion which accompanies economies of scale . The
incentives are now for further expansion of trade . The creation of trading blocks
which are organized around economies of scale is therefore part of a broader trend
towards increasingly open world markets.
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5 The Americas : Traditional Comparative Advantage
or Economies of Scale
G . Chichilnisky
The pattern of trade inside the blocks is of particular importance for an American
free trade zone . Trade within NAFTA is mosty based on traditional comparative
advantage and on the diversity between the traders' economic development rather
than on economies of scale . Exports from Mexico to the US are mostly petroleum
or resource based products, a pattern which holds also for the rest of Latin
America . Therefore NAFTA's characteristics are unfavourable to global free
trade.
The matter is not only one of economic reality: it is also one of perceived
economic reality. Both the European and the East Asian countries perceive gains
from trade as a matter of exploiting economies of scale . The newly industrialized
countries in Asia, and the Japanese, have a dynamic vision of comparative
advantages. Moving up the ladder of comparative advantages in the production
and trade of skilled-labor manufactures, of consumer electronics, and of products
based on specialized knowledge and on technological skill, are widespread
priorities .
By contrast, within the sphere of influence of the US, the vision of trade based
on traditional comparative advantages still prevails . It permeates to a great extent
the thinking about international trade at the government level, at the international
organization level, at the academic, and even at the journalistic level .
The European free trade zone is, to a certain extent, a zone of equals . To
encourage this equality, the free mobility of labor has been one of the first steps in
the European integration of 1992 .
The Americas, on the other hand, have the US as a hegemon, a "hub" which
concentrates on exporting manufactures and skill intensive goods to the "spokes"
in exchange for their resources. The free mobility of labor between the hub and the
spokes is an unspoken issue. It has not even been contemplated in the American
negotiations for free trade. It has not been mentioned by any of the governments
concerned that labor could move freely between the NAFTA trade partners, as it is
in the EU. In some cases, quite to the contrary, the free trade agreement has been
mentioned as a way to limit the mobility of laborbetween the concerned countries,
such as Mexico and the US.
To the extent that labor remains a fixed input of production within the
countries of the Americas, traditional comparative advantages based on labor will
be invoked as a foundation for policy. The concern is that an American free trade
zone, if it emerges, may reflect the historical patterns of trade between industrial
and developing regions, which is usually called North-South trade . These patterns
would not be conducive to the overall liberalization of world trade .
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6 Traditional Comparative Advantage and the Global Environment
The global environment provides another argument against traditional com-
parative advantages . Traditional comparative advantages emphasize the South's
concentration in the production and export of goods which deplete environmen-
tal resources, such as wood pulp and cash crops which overuse rain forests, and
fossil fuels and minerals whose combustion leads to the emission of greenhouse
gases . Recent work in the area of North-South trade with environmental inputs
to production (Chichilnisky [6, 7]) shows that poorly defined patterns of
property rights on forests, fisheries, and arable land in developing countries may
lead to a market-induced oversupply of products which are intensive in the use
of these resources, and to Pareto inefficient patterns of international trade.
Indeed, it is shown in Chichilnisky [6, 7] that differences in property rights can
by themselves explain the patterns of trade between nations. What appears as
comparative advantages may simply be a reflection of a market failure which
through the magnifying glass of international trade leads to an inefficient
overuse of resources in the entire world economy. Social and private compara-
tive advantages differ, and social and private gains from trade may also differ in
these circumstances [6, 7] .
The global environment is therefore another argument against traditional
comparative advantages as a foundation for trade ." Since two thirds of the current
exports from Latin America are resources, and the main trade of Ecuador,
Venezuela and Mexico with the US is petroleum, this problem is very real. It is also
very real with respect to the trading in wood products which lead to the
deforestations of the remaining tropical forests in Central and South America [ 1-3,
13] . Petroleum extraction in Ecuador destroys its Amazonian resources . Replacing
traditional comparative advantages with economies of scale could be a necessary
feature of a program of sustainable development .
7 External Economies of Scale are Labor and Knowledge Intensive
It seems desirable at this point to distinguish between two types of economies of
scale : internal to the firm, or external to it . The former occur when each firm is
more efficient in the use of its inputs to production as the level of its output
increases . Such economies of scale are typical of traditional industries which
require large fixed costs, such as aerospace, airlines, and automobiles . This type of
increasing returns, called internal, can lead to monopolistic competition or other
Tradional tax policies, levying duties on the use of such inputs in the South, may not work if
they lead to lower income levels, and may indeed lead to more extraction of the resource and
more exports of the resource intensive commodity. Property rights policies may be more
effective in this case .
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8 Optimal Tariffs
8.1 Traditional Theory With Decreasing Returns
G. Chichilnisky
forms of limitations to market entry. There is a loss to the consumer because free
market outcomes are typically not Pareto efficient when firms have market power
and can influence prices .
There is a different type : external economies of scale . These also lead to a
decrease in per unit costs as the ouput expands, but they do so at the level of the
industry or of the country as a whole . Each firm's production function faces
increasing cost per unit of output, i.e . decreasing returns to scale, which assures
competitive behavior . However, as the industry expands, externalities are created
which lead to increased productivity for all the firms . A good example is provided
by the electronics industry . Each computer manufacturer faces a competitive
market . On the other hand, as the overall level of output of the industry expands,
knowledge about new technologies develops and is rapidly diffused across the
industry leading to lower costs for all . Any industry which depends heavily on
knowledge has this characteristic . Increasing returns originate in the skill of labor,
which embodies knowledge . Knowledge is typically diffused and can be captured
and imitated sooner or later . There are abundant examples in the software and
hardware industry to prove this point 12 . Knowledge creates skilled labor, and this
in turn leads to increasing returns to scale, which are often external to the firm. This
can lead simultaneously to economies of scale and to competitive markets . The
successful development experiences of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and more generally
the Asian Tigers, shows that export-led policies based on skilled labor intensive
goods, for example in consumer electronics, is more successful than those based on
inexpensive and uneducated labor. This point was developed formally in
Chichilnisky [5], [4], and more recently of Dadzie [10] .
In this paper I concentrate on external economies of scale, which are closely
connected with production system based on skilled labor . It should be noted that
the areas most favorable to external economies of scale, such as software
production, are labor intensive rather than capital intensive . Therefore they are
particularly well suited for developing countries with abundant and skilled labor. 13
A second traditional concern about trade blocks is that they generate incentives
to levy tariffs on outsiders. I mentioned above that, under traditional assump-
tions, a large country will typically impose tariffs so as to improve its terms of
12 Microsoft's Windows excellent imitation of the Apple operating system was tested in the US
courts and found without fault.
13 India is a good example; it exports software news succesfully . So is Mexico, which produces
chips. Barbados is planning a shift to an information-age society in one generation .
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trade . In doing so it typically introduces distortions in its production and
consumption. Here I will show in a simple example how under traditional
assumptions there is a tariff that improves welfare, in the sense that the gains
from improved terms of trade exceed the losses from distortions. The analysis is
completely standard, but it is included in order to highlight the differences which
arise in economies with increasing returns to scale . This section discusses
economies with decreasing returns: the next section discusses economies with
increasing returns .
The analysis in this section relies on one assumption and one simplification .
Both are lifted in the Appendix, which considers the general case . The assumption
here is that the supply and demand curves of the economy are linear and, as already
mentioned, supply exhibits decreasing returns to scale ." The simplification is to
neglect the impact of the tariff revenues on income ; this is typically done in
textbooks, and will also be done in this section. It is however explicitly analyzed in
the Appendix .
Assume that the home country H has a demand curve with equation
where p,, is the world price . The internal price in country H exceeds the world price
by the tariff:
p = P.,
14 See e.g . [171, Appendix to Chapter 9.
(5)
In a world equilibrium imports must equal exports :
(a - e) - (b +f)(p. + t) = g fi hp,, . (6)
D=a-bp, (1)
where p is the domestic price of the good, and a supply curve
Q=e+fp . (2)
Contry H's demand for imports is the difference
D-Q=(a-e)-(b+f)p . (3)
Foreign export supply is also a straight line
(Q*- D*)=g+ hp, (4)
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Solving equation (6) for t = 0 gives pf, the world price that would prevail without
tariffs . Then a tariff t alters the internal price to :
and
p=pf+th/(b +f-h),
and the world price to
pw = pf - t (b + f)l(b + .f + h) .
Note that if the parameters a, e, b, h andf are all positive, then
pf <p and pK,<pf,
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implying that the tariff raises the internal price p and lowers the world price p,.
It is immediate to show that, under these conditions, it is always possible
to find a tariff t that increases the country's welfare . Let q, and d, be the free
trade levels of consumption and production . Since the internal prive is higher
after the tariff, domestic supply rises from q, to q2 and demand falls from d,
to d2:
The gain in welfare from a lower world price is the area of the rectangle in Figure 3,
the fall in the price multiplied by the level of imports after the tariff:
gain in welfare = (d2 - q2) x t(b +f)/(b +f+ h)
= t x (d, - q,) x (b +f)/(b +f+ h) - (t)2 x h(b +f)2/(b +f+ h)2 .
	
(12)
The loss from distorted consumption is the sum of the areas of the two triangles in
Figure 3 :
loss in welfare =(1/2)x(82-q,)x(p-pf)+(1/2)x(d, -d2)x(p-pf)
=(t)2 x(b+f)xh 2/2(b+f+h)2 . (13)
Therefore the net effect on welfare is
gain - loss = t x U- (t)2 x V. (14)
q2 = q, + tfh/(b +f + h) (10)
d2 = d, - tbh/(b +f+ h) . (11)
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where Uand Vare constants . The net effect is the sum of a positive number times
the tariff rate and a negative number times the square of the tariff rate . It follows
that when the tariff is sufficiently small the net effect must be positive, since t 2 is
smaller than t, for t near zero . This establishes that, when supply and demand are
linear, income effects of the tariff income are neglected and tariffs are small, there
exists a positive tariff which increases the welfare of the country beyond that which
can be obtained in free trade . Therefore there is a positive optimal tariff.
Of course, the size of the country matters . If the importing country is small,
then foreign supply is highly elastic i.e . h is very large, so from (8) one verifies that
the tariff has little or no effect on world prices pw, while raising domestic prices p
almost one-to-one.
8 .2 Optimal Tariffs With Economies of Scale
Fig. 3. Gains and Losses from Tariffs :
q Traditional Case.
The argument in the previous section shows that under traditional assumptions a
large country is better off by imposing tariffs than it is under free trade. This
proposition holds when the supply of goods increases with prices . In our example,
this is formalized by the parameters in the supply function in equation (2), which is
upward sloping . However, this assumption ceases to be valid when the economy
has economies of scale . In such economies the larger is the output the lower are the
costs, and therefore, in principle, the lower are the prices . Thenf< 0 in equation (8)
or h <0 in equation (4) which in turn can lead to a negative welfare gain from the
tariff from equation (12) .
A good example of this phenomenon is provided by the electronics industry,
for example, computer hardware . The last fifteen years have seen a dramatic
decrease in prices together with a dramatic expansion of output of computer
164
hardware . This occurs because the expansion in output leads to rationalization and
the corresponding increased efficiency in production . In the hardware industry this
takes the form of technological change which improves productive efficiency and
lowers the costs of the industry as a whole . Even though a technological
breakthrough may in principle be patented, and therefore could be captured by one
firm with the corresponding increase in its market power and deviation from
competitive behavior, in practice the computer industry is very competitive . This is
because the knowledge which drives the technological innovation in this industry is
easily diffused .
I shall now show how the analysis of optimal tariffs in the last section breaks
down when there are increasing returns to scale. In such economies there may be no
gains from imposing tariffs, even if the country is large and has substantial market
power. The optimal tariff theorem no longer holds . I will explain how this happens
in a concrete case .
It is useful to recall first how tariffs increase welfare in the economy of the
previous section . Tariffs increase welfare by lowering the world prices pH, : this was
seen in equation (7) . The country's terms of trade thus improve after the tariff : It
imports fewer lower cost goods from the rest of the world . The welfare gains were
computed in equation (12) : these depend crucially on the fact that, after the tariff,
the consumers pay lower prices for the goods they import.
However, this argument no longer hold with economies of scale . With
economies of scale the world price may increase rather than decrease after the
tariff. The welfare gains from tariffs are measured by the drop in world prices
times the quantity imported. But if the world price increases, the gains become
losses .
After a tariff the terms of trade can deteriorate for the country; this was
studied in A. Lerner [18] and in L. Metzler [23] . They argue mostly in terms of
income effects, not in terms of increasing returns. A similar phenomenon occurs in
economies with increasing returns, but due to different causes . With increasing
returns, in constrast with the economyof the previous section, the parametersfand
h in equations (8) and (4) are negative rather than positive . This means that across
equilibria the prices drop as quantities increase, or otherwise, price increase when
quantities drop . If the tariff decreases the quantitiy produced and traded, this
lowers the efficiency of the economy. Costs increase and therefore prices increase
too . The tariff defeats the gains from rationalization in production produced by the
larger market size. This is represented in Figure 4 above. It shows a negative
correlation between market clearing prices and the quantity of goods sold at an
equilibrium, and how this can lead to an increase in the world prices after the tariff,
corresponding with the decrease in output .
With increasing returns, after the tariff, the world price pw can be higher with
rather than lower as it is in the traditional case . 15 The terms of trade for the country
15 A formal proof is in the Appendix.
G. Chichilnisky
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World price
after tariff
World price
before tariff
Price of B
A
Quantity of B
Fig. 4. Losses from Tariffs with Increasing Returns. International Market equilibrium: S, andD,
are the supply and demand for exports and imports of B, respectively, at the first equilibrium
without tariffs. The tariff shifts downward the demand schedule to DZ . The lower quantity
exported (x) is associated to less efficiency andtherefore to higher prices, due to increasing returns
to scale. For a mathematical analysis, see the Appendix.
are therefore worse after the tariff. Consumers in the country are worse off: the
price of their imports have increased. All of this is established rigorously in the
appendix .
A economies of scale, the optimal tarifftheorem is no longer true . The region's
terms of trade can decrease with the imposition of tariffs, so that the importing
region has no incentive to impose tariffs on others : it looses by restricting trade.
Consumer electronics, semiconductors, software production, banking and
financial services, and any sector whose productivity depends mostly on knowl-
edge and information have these characteristics. Software production is today
actively developed in India as an export business . It is a sector which is
simultaneously labor and knowledge intensive and subject to economies of scale .
As already discussed the remarkable economic development of the Asian Tigers
over the last fifteen years profited from the expansion of their international
trade of skilled-labor intensive products such as consumer electronics . This
sector is simultaneously labor intensive and subject to economies of scale.
All the arguments just presented hold equally for countries or for trading
blocks . To the extent that sectors with economies of scale expand within the free
trade zone, the zone itself loses its economic incentives to use its market power to
restrict trade and to wage tariff wars .
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9 Conclusions
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I have argued that the formation of trading blocks harms the liberalization of
markets when the blocks are organized around traditional comparative advan-
tages . Under these conditions, the larger is the market power of the block, the
larger are its incentives to impose tariffs . Protectionism emerges from the increased
market power of the traders .
Retaliation can lead to a tariff war between the blocks. Furthermore under
traditional assumptions, the larger country wins the tariff war . Therefore the
larger is the trading block, the more likely it is to impose tariffs and to win a
trade war.
Trading blocks of this nature have no economic incentive to favor world's free
trade. They are better of with tariffs than with free trade. I argued that, to a certain
extent, this explains the difficulties of the Gatt negotiations .
I discussed the example of the EU block in contrast with NAFTA. The
evidence suggests that the EU benefited from increasing returns to scale .
NAFTA, and any eventual America free trading block, emerged as a strategic
response to the increased market power of the European trading block . By contrast
with the EU, the emerging NAFTA appears to be organizing under the traditional
theory of comparative advantage.
The lack of any provision forthe mobility of labor between the countries of the
region reinforces this trend. NAFTA does not contemplate the mobility of labor
between Mexico and the US . The lack of labor mobility tends to lock-in the
traditonal comparative advantages between the countries within the area . Their
trading of the basis of comparative advantages within the block will create
incentives for trade wars between the blocks .
But NAFTA could be organized around economies of scale . Examples for
such scenarios include Indian software trade, and the Asian Tigers' specialization
in consumer electronics. Typically, electronic-based industries have increasing
returns derived from the creation and diffusion of knowledge as output expands.
This leads to rationalization in production and to increased efficiency and thus
lower costs . The expansion of output is accompanied by lower rather than higher
prices . From the point of view of the exporter, these markets are less likely to be
protected because the importer, having increasing returns to scale in this industry,
has less incentives to rely on tariffs than it does in other industries with decreasing
returns. With increasing returns, tariffs decrease trade and can increase world
prices, thus decreasing the welfare of the importing country. Economies of scale
produce incentives to expand trade.
Economies of scale can defeat the standard result on optimal tariffs . While
under traditional conditions, a trading block is always better of with tariffs than it
is with free trade, with increasing returns to scale this is no longer true . Tariffs
decrease the size of the market, and therefore decrease productive efficiency in
economies with increasing returns. This decrease in efficiency leads to larger rather
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than lower world prices, and the main purpose of the tariff, which is to improve the
countries' terms of trade defeat . Underthese conditions trading blocks are better of
with free trade and with the corresponding expanded market, than they are with
tariffs .
To the extent that NAFTA organizes itself around economies of scale the
incentives for a trade wars between NAFTA and the EC are mitigated.
It seems useful to remind ourselves that the choice of products and of
technology are, to a certain extent, open to policy . Countries with good
educational systems, developed or not, can choose to follow development patterns
with a concentration of knowledge-intensive products, avoiding the over exploi-
tation of natural resources and exports of uneducated labor-intensive products .
Those countries with poor educational systems can do better by investing in human
capital and thus opening knowlege-intensive patterns of development for their
future.
In any case, a choice of product, need not interfere with market efficiency .
The first welfare theorem about the efficiency of competitive markets applies to
a market with given technologies and with given products . The theorem does
not explain how different technologies or products arise : it proves that once
technologies and products are given, competive markets lead to Pareto ef-
ficiency . Once the product mix and the technologies are chosen the market can
operate efficiently . This implies that the organizing principles within the blocks
- traditional comparative advantages or economies of scale - are, to a certain
extent, a policy choice . Technologies and a different product mix can be
achieved without market distortions or loss of market efficiency . This point was
already made by James Meade several years ago [22] .
The emergence of an American trading block which reinforces the current
tendency toward the exploitation of traditonal comparative advantages is a
source of concern . It has been argued Chichilnisky [4, 5, 9] that export led
policies based on (unskilled) labor intensive products can defeat the goals of
development and trade by depressing the country's terms of trade and overall
consumption . Trade between the countries of the Americas is organized today
around traditonal comparative advantages: labor and resource intensive exports
from the South and capital and skill-intensive exports from the North. If the
emergence of an America free trade zone is based on similar principles, then not
only may this continue a depressing growth trend in Latin America, but in
addition it could create or reinforce incentives against the global liberalization
of free trade.
Another reason to avoid trade policies based on traditional comparative
advantages is that they tend to deplete environmental assets such as forests,
fisheries or fertile land, and overuse minerals which are exported by the developing
countries to the North. Some of these minerals are the source of potentially
dangerous COZ emissions . Petroleum exported from Mexico, Ecuador and
Venezuela to the USA fits this description. Indeed, any concept of sustainable
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development requires a rethinking of trade policies away from those based on
comparative advantages . This general premise is particularly well suited to the
NAFTA, and to the Americas as a whole, since two thirds of Latin American
exports today are resources .
The main point of this paper is that the characteristics of trading policies
within the trading blocks can determine the extent to which the block will favor or
harm global free trade. Trading policies based on comparative advantages are
generally negative . Trading policies based on economies of scale can be positive .
They can mitigate the economic incentive towards tariffs and favor instead the
expansion of world's trade. The emergence of such trading blocks could advance in
tandem with the global liberalization of trade .
10 Appendix: Trading Blocks with Endogenous Technology
and Increasing Returns to Scale
10.1 A Two Region Two Good Model With Endogenous Technology
and Economies of Scale
This appendix introduces and develops an international trade model, and proves
rigorously the propositions stated in the body of the paper.
The model presented here extends the North-South model introduced in
Chichilnisky [4, 5, 9] in several directions . One is to allow technologies given by
Cobb-Douglas production functions;" a second aspect is that countries here trade
in goods produced under conditions of increasing returns to scale, while previous
work considered constant returns to scale.
At least one of the goods (B) is produced here under increasing returns to
scale; the second good (I) could be produced either with constant returns or with
increasing returns to scale. A novel aspect of this model is that the increasing
returns are here external to the firm: each firm takes technology as given, a Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns, multiplied by a coefficient y.
This parameter y is treated as given by the firm. However y varies with the
production of the whole sector, making all those firms having increasing returns
simultanously more productive at an equilibrium in which more is produced .
Therefore technologies are endogenous: the returns to scale of each sector are
endogenously determined along with all other variables, at the equilibrium.
Competitive markets are assumed throughout : firms maximize profits and the
classic marginal conditions prevail.
The material is presented as follows: first I formulate the model for one region;
then I extend this to two trading regions. I then find one explicit equation, a
16 Chichilnisky [4, 5] considered fixed coefficients technologies .
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"resolving equation", which solves the model analytically as a function of only one
variable : the terms of trade. From this equation one calculates analytically a
complete solution of the model from the values of its exogenous parameters, by
solving for the equilibrium values of the terms of trade. Finally I establish formally
that, with increasing returns to scale, large countries can achieve higher welfare
levels with free trade than with tariffs. This means that increasing returns can
defeat the optimal tariff theorem.
The model describes two regions, 1 and 2, producing and trading two goods B
(basic goods) and I (industrial goods) with each other; these goods are produced
using two inputs, labor L and capital, K. The economies of the two countries are
competitive, so that in each region prices are taken as given by consumers and
producers . Producers maximize profits, and consumers maximize utility subject to
their budget constraints . Walras Law is satisfied, so that the value of the excess
demand is equal to zero . At an equilibrium all markets, for goods and for factors,
clear.
The increasing returns to scale considered here are "external" to the firm as in
the examples discussed in the text . This means that in the production functions,
formalized below, the parameter y increases with the total level of output of the
economy. As the output of the economy expands, the production function varies,
formalizing the notion that factors are more productive at higher levels of
aggregate output. To obtain the results presented here, all that is required is that
the production function becomes more productive as the output of one of the
good (B) increases . The firms take this parameters y as 'given - this is the
assumption that the increasing returns are external to the firm. For each given
value of the parameter y the firm has constant returns to scale . The firms are
therefore competitive, and in particular zero profits are achieved at an equilib-
rium .
10.2 One Region Model
Consider the model of one region first . The production fuctions are"
BS - yLiKi _a
IS - yLflK2-fi (16)
17 Note that there is no specification of supply behaviour outside ofequilibrium, because as far as
the firm is concerned there are constant returns to scale in production so that profit maximizing
supply functions are, as is standard with constant returns, undefined. As is standard, one
derives supply and demand simultaneously at an equilibrium from the condition of full
employment of factors and market clearing, and in this model this is done together with a
condition which incorporates the simultaneous determination of the parameter giving the
extent of economies of scale .
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where a, fe(0,1), y is a positive parameter determining returns to scale which is
determined endogenously at an equilibrium, L, and K, are the inputs of labor and
capital in the B sector, and L, and K, the inputs of labor and capital in the I sector .
The total amount of labor and capital in the economy are LS and KS respectively .
Prices are PB and pi ; we assume that I is the numeraire so that
Factor prices are denoted as usual: w for wages and r for rental on capital . I
shall assume for simplicity that the demand for basic goods at an equilibrium is
known:
Bd =,u(wL) + (1 -,u)rK,
	
0 < u < 1 . (18)
By Walras Law the demand for industrial goods in equilibrium is
Id = (wL' + rKs - PBB d), (19)
because there are zero profits derived from the firm's profit maximization under
constant returns to scale . Demand functions other than (18) can be postulated
without changing the results, see for example the various demand functions
utilized in Chichilnisky [5] . Indicating the equilibrium level of exports by XB* and
the equilibrium level of imports by XI*, the model of the world economy is
formalized by the following equilibrium conditions:
PaBl * + I* = w*L* + r*K* (zero profits)
K* = KS = K, + KZ (capital market clears)
L* = LS = L, + LZ (labor market clears) (20)
BS* = B d * + A,B* (B market clears)
Id* = IS* + XI* (I market clears)
y = y(B*, I*) (endogenous technology) .
10 .3 Two Region Model
The model for the world economy consists of two regions, indicated with the
indices 1 and 2, each specified as above. To solve the model, there are therefore
five prices to the determined: the "terms of trade" PB, and two factor prices in
each country: w an r. The quantities to be determined in an equilibrium are the
use of factors in each sector of each region: K,, K2 , L,, LZ and the outputs of the
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two goods BS and IS . At the equilibrium one obtains endogenously the value of
the parameter y determining the external economies of scale in each sector of the
economy y = y(B *, I * ) . At an equilibrium one also determines the exports and
imports of each of the two goods in each of the two regions, XB* and X'j *, and the
demand for each good in each region : Bd* Id *. There is therefore a total of twenty
seven variables to be determined endogenously at an equilibrium, including all
prices and quantities in all markets and in both regions .
The following Proposition 1 proves that all of these variables can be
determined once the variable giving the terms of trade in equilibrium PB is known .
Furthermore I prove that there exists one "resolving equation" which determines
the equilibrium value of the terms of trade as a function of all the exogenous
parameters of the model.
The are six exogenous parameters in each region: a, fl, a, Bd* , LSand KS, and a
total of twelve in the world economy. The impact of changes in each of these
parameters on the equilibrium of the model can be traced analytically via the
"resolving equation".
10.4 Solving the Model With a Single "Resolving" Equation
in the Terms of Trade
Proposition 1
There exists one "resolving" equation depending only on the terms of trade, from
which a complete solution of the two region model can be computed explicitly as a
function of all the exogenous parameters of the model.
Proof
The proof consists of writing the market clearing conditions on the world market
forB and substituting step by step until one finds one expression which depends on
all the exogenous parameters of the model and only on one variable : the terms of
trade . Then I show that all other endogenous variables can be found once the terms
of trade are known, including of course the value of the returns to scale parameter y
which defines the technology . The proofproceeds in a number of steps . In step 1, I
express the labor and capital ratios used in the two industries 1, and 12, as functions
of the terms of trade, PB. Step 2 express the level of capital and labor used a
functions OfPB. Step 3 expresses output in the two sectors as functions OfPB and the
technology parameter y . Step 4 expresses the output levels in the two sectors as a
function of pa alone, by carrying out a simple "fixed point" argument on the
technology parameter y. Step 5 expresses the international market claring con-
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dition in the B market as a function of PB alone, thus producing the desired
"resolving equation" . Finally, Step 6 shows how all endogenous variables in the
model are determined once pa is known .
Consider a world economy with two regions defined as in equations (16-20) . I
now solve the model by finding an explicit expression for the equilibrium terms of
trade pB in the world economy. I shall use the indices 1 and 2 to distinguish the
parameters of the two countries . It is important to observe that since I have given
no specification of demand or supply behaviour outside of an equilibrium, there is
no information for carrying out stability analysis . Since the model has constant
returns to scale, profit maximizing supply functions are, as is standard, undefined.
In fact, there are many possible and equally good specifications of disequilibrium
behaviour in this model, each leading to different stability properties (which are
not analyzed here). For stability analysis, see Chichilnisky [4] and [5]. As is
standard in models with constant returns to scale, derive the equilibrium relations
between supplies and prices from the condition of full employment of factors
together with an equilibrium condition which incorporates the external economies
of scale .
Step 1: express the labor and capital ratios used in the two industries as a function
of the term of trade. The strategy is to used logarithmic expressions and then
convert these. Denote:
and
so that
h = L,/K,
12 = L2/K2
Since by assumption each firm takes the parameter y as given, from the production
functions (16), marginal conditions and zero profits imply:
w = Ya(Li1Ki)"PB = yali -1P
r = y(1 - a)1;PB
w = Yflfl-I
r = Y(I - /3)112
r =
(1 -a) 11, and r = ( 1 -9) 1
w a w /3 2
(21)
(22)
(23)
Trade Regimes and Gatt : Resource Intensive vs . Knowledge Intensive Growth
	
173
and in particular
and (22) can be rewritten as :
so that
and
and
fl) a]
12-a)]
Indicating natural logarithms with the symbol "-" the four equations in (21)
w=(a-1)11 +a+pB +y
r=all +(1-a)+pB+y
w=(~3- 1)12 +/3+y
r` = /312+(1 - fl)+Y .
(24)
(25)
(a - 1)11	 +pB = (~ - 1)12 + (26)
all -(I-a)+pB=/312+(l-r/3),
or equivalently
( a - 1)11-(I -#)12=fl-PB-a
all - #12=(l
-_
fl) - pB - (lea).
Solving the system (28) of two linear equations in 11 ,12 one obtains :
[(,8 -PB - ti)(-fl) - (I - fl)[( l~fl) - PB - (I-a)]
[fl-al
(27)
(28)
(29)
1 [(a - 1) [( I~P) - PB - (I- a)] - [0 - PB - a) a]]2 = (30)
[P - a]
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From (29) and (30) one obtains:
11 = PB to
(31)(9 - a)
and
where
and
and
12 = PB B
(~ - a)
with A > 0 and B <0 if /3 < a . Therefore
A 1/(fi - a)11=e Pa
12 = eBp9(fi_a) .
(32)
Step 1 is therefore completed: 1 1 and 12 are expressed as functions of terms of
trade PB.
Step 2. Express labor and capital used as function ofPB. Since
12=
LS-LKS-K) .LS-L1 =12(KS-K1 ) or L1 =Ls-12(K'-K1 )
1
(33)
and
11=L1/K1>L1 = 11K1 so that by (33) Ls - 12(KS- K1)=11K1 (34)
K1 (11-12) =L S -12Ks and K1 = (LS - 12KS)l(11 - 12). (35)
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From (33)-(35) one obtains:
and
and
Kl =
(Ls - 12Ks)
(11 - 12)
L1 =
(11)
(LS- 12Ks) (37)
(11 - IZ)
from which together with (32) one obtains the levels of supply of labor and capital
used in each sector at an equilibrium, as a function of the equilibrium level of the
relative price of B:
thus completing Step 2 of the proof. Step 3 is to express output levels as a function
of the terms of trade . From (16), (38) and (39) one obtains the quantity ofB and I
produced at each level of relative prices, PB. Since these relations hold for every
level of y, taking y= 1, I denote these as 0(PB) and V (PB) respectively . Therefore
from (16) one obtains the equilibrium level of outputs as a function of equilibrium
prices :
B S = YO(PB)-
Is= Y'V(PA
(36)
(40)
In the case that the sector I has also external economies of scale - which is not a
necessary assumption for the results, one obtains similarly:
where Y' could be in principle different from y. Equation (40) is almost what
is needed for Step 4 but not quite : observe that (40) does not fully express
outputs as an explicit function of equilibrium prices because y=y(B). In order
to obtain outputs as functions of equilibrium prices, alone, one must also find
out simultaneously the equilibrium value of y = y*(B) . This is "fixed point"
problem, since for each given PB, y depends on B while for each PB, B depends
L1
eALs eAeB
= (fl -a)- KSPa (38)
(eA A- eB) (e - eB)
K1 Ls= -eA p
B'a -# eB(eA- eB)KS_ eB (39)
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y. This is solved in Step 4, which follows, by a simple "fixed point"
argument.
Recall that the economy has increasing returns which are external to the firm,
and the parameter y is assumed in (16) to increase with the level of output ofB (and
potentially also I) . For example":
y=y(B)=B(Y, Q< 1 . (41)
At an equilibrium equations (40) and (41) must be satisfied simultaneously, i.e .
Y = LY ' O(PB)1°
= Y 07 O(PB) ° , or Y 1-Q = O(PB)°
so that
Y = 0(PB)°i(1-a)
Therefore at an equilibrium (40) and (41) imply a relation between the output ofB
and PB. If one assumes that Ihas external economies as well (which is not necessary
for the Results), then one could have a similar expression for I:
so that :
Lemma 2
When Q > 1, the partial equilibrium supply function of each firm producing B is an
increasing function of the price ofB, PB. However, due to the external economies of
scale, as the total output ofB increases within the region this leads to drops in the price
PB across equilibria, since O(PB)is a decreasing function of the price PB. Note
that since Q> l,
G . Chichilniskv
(42)
(45)
18 This is an example. In general y = y(B*, I * ). The general case admits a similar solution, at the
cost of more notation .
B S = O(PB)'l(1-Q)
IS = Y/(PB)'l(1-Q') (43)
Note that
when Q > 1, B = 1/1 -c<0 (44)
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PB
A
Proof
0 (PB)
defining the implicit function
0 (PB ) 1-o
Fig . 5 . Each firm faces an upward
cost curve. Howerer, the sector B
as a whole faces a downward cost
curve due to external economies of
B scale.
This follows directly : O(PB) is an increasing function ofPB for each fixed y, but from
(44), 6= 1/ 1 - Q < 0, so that increases in total output across equilibria leads to lower
prices, see Figure 5 .
The next step is Step S: to produce the "resolving equation" for the two region
model . To solve the model we now consider the market clearing condition inB. At a
world equilibrium, the B market must clear so that :
Bd, '(PB-t) -Bs, '(PB+t)=BS,2 (PB) -Bd,2(PA
F(PB,t)=Bd''(PB+t)-Bs,'(PB+t)-BS,2(PB)+Bd.2(PB)=0 . (46)
From (18), (19), (21), (32) and (43), equation (46) is a function of the variable PB
alone, which we call a "resolving" equation for this model . Solving the equation
F= 0 gives the equilibrium values of PB. Finally Step 6 consists of showing that the
equilibrium values of all other variables can be computed from that of PB. From
(32) one obtains 1, and 12; from this and (38), (39) one obtains L, and K, ; from (22)
one obtains r and w in each region ; BS and IS are obtained in each region from (43) .
Demand forBand I in each region is obtained from (18) and (19) . The model is thus
solved . This completes the proof of Proposition 1 . 11
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The following result has two parts. The first part (1) shows that under the
conditions, increasing returns to scale defeat the optimal tariff argument since a
tariff on imports leads to lower terms of trade for the importing country. For the
second part, assume that u = 1, so that Bd = wL, and that # is small, /3 < a; these
assumptions are not necessary and are not used to prove that the terms of trade of
the importing region worsen after the tariff. They are only made to simplify the
proof of the second part of the Proposition, (ii), namely that the importing regions'
welfare decreases after the tariff - other assumptions could be made leading to the
same results .
Proposition 3
Consider a world economy asformalized above, in which both regions produce B under
condition of external economies of scale. The demandfor imports ofB by region 1
decreases with world prices of B, and the exporting region, 2, has strong external
economies of scale in B:
y = y(B) = Ba, with er > 1,
and aXB 2/dPB < 0 is relatively large in absolute value. Then (i) no tariff can improve
the terms of trade of the importing region over and above those which the region
achieves underfree trade, and (ii) the welfare of the importing region is lower with a
tariff than without .
Proof
Part (i) first. It is useful to recall first the standard argument for optimal tariffs
dicussed above in Section 8.1 ; this will be only used here as an illustration and to
aid intuition . The formal proof is given after this example.
Example 4
Define simple linearfunctionsfor home supply and demand, respectively D = a - bp,
andQ = e +fp, so that the demandfor imports in D - Q = (a - e) - (b +f)p, and define
similarly a linear foreign export supply (Q+ -D *) = g + hp, where pw is the world
price, and p,, + t =p. In a world equilibrium imports must equal exports:
(a-e)-(b+f)(pw+t)=g+hp. . (47)
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Solving equation (47) for t=0 gives pf the world price without tariffs . Then a tariff
takes the worldprice top, = pf - t (b +f)l(b -f-h) and the internalprice to p = pf - t hl
(b +f+ h) . Note that if all parameters are positive, then pf < p, andpw. < pf, implying
that the tariff raises the internal price pf and lowers the world price px .. Unter this
conditions it is easy to see that a positive tariffexists that makes the country better off,
because the welfare gains from a tariff obtain from an increase of imports at lower
prices, see Section 8.1 . Matters change if the economies have increasing returns: in
that case the parameters can change sign, for example, iff< 0 and is sufficiently large
in absolute value, then after the tariff the worldpricepx, can be higher than pf . Terms
of trade therefore worsen for the country who imposes the tariff, and the gainsfrom
the tariffare lost, because worldprices increase with respect to domestic prices, while
the losses from distortions remain.
I now formalize this example within the equilibrium model of trade defined in this
Appendix . The intuition is the same, but it is carried out rigorously using the
"resolving equation" and the implicit function theorem .
One studies first the changes in the terms of trade as a function of the tariff t,
and shows that the tariff leads to higher rather than lower world prices so that the
importing country has better terms of trade without tariffs . By the implicit function
theorem from (46) :
aPdat= -aFlat
aFlapB
-a(Bd,I -Bs.1)/a(PB-t)
[a(B d. I -Bs.'Va(PB -r t)] - [a (Bd, Z -BS'2)laPB1
(48)
By the assumptions a(Bd.' -BS`')la(PB+ t) < 0 and therefore the numerator of (48)
is positive . The denominator is positive by the assumptions on foreign supply,
because due to economies of scale (dX~'/apB) = a (BS , 2 - Bd, Z)/aPB is negative and
relatively large (see Lemma 2 above) . Therefore, by (48) dPBla t > 0: this means
that, in a new equilibrium after the tariff t is imposed, the world price PB increases,
so that the importer's terms of trade worsen as stated in (i) . The optimal tariff
argument is therefore defeated .
Part (ii) next . One shows that lower terms of trade lead region 1 to a lower
welfare level . Since in the world equilibrium with tariffs the world price pB
increases, so does the domestic price which is PB + t . Since the importing economy
has increasing returns in the B sector, this increase inPB after the tariff could only be
associated to a lower domestic output of the good B . Furthermore, since the
exports of the exporting region decrease with prices, the imports of B by region 1
must have decreased as well . Therefore in the new equilibrium the domestic
consumption of good B, Bd, is lower in region l . Finally, consider region I's
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consumption of good I. By Walras' law (19), Id = rK. Now by (32) when # < a, as pa
increases 12 decreases ; by (22) this implies that r decreases as well implying that
Id = rK decreases after the tariff as well . Since both the consumption ofB and the
consumption of I decrease at home after the tariff in the importing country, the
welfare of the importing country decreases after the tariff, completing the proof of
Proposition 3. G
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